Assembly line model for the manufacturing in supply chain of nuclear weapons and legacy for private UK-LTD assessment in the United States

The provided documents offer in-depth technical information on nuclear weapon design, focusing on atomic and hydrogen bombs. For atomic bombs, details on fission reactions with core materials like plutonium and uranium are provided, along with designs like “Fat Man” and “Little Boy” and testing operations like Sandstone and Ranger. Hydrogen bombs, featuring both fission and fusion reactions, are also discussed, with insights into components like the Primary and Secondary and advancements in design with beryllium reflectors and enriched lithium deuteride fuels. Boosted Fission Devices are highlighted for their use of deuterium and tritium gas, enhancing fission reactions’ efficiency. The documents also clarify fission-to-fusion ratios in thermonuclear weapons. Additionally, a separate document examines the weights and configurations of plutonium and uranium cores in nuclear weapons. The discussion revolves around core materials crucial for nuclear weapons, particularly delta-plutonium (δ-Pu) and Oralloy (Oy), each optimized for different designs like solid, hollow, and composite cores. Historical nuclear tests like “Fat Man” and “Little Boy” are referenced, revealing core specifications and yield disparities. Efficiency is compared between Oy and Pu, varying with core configurations. Yields range from kiloton to megaton-level explosions, especially in thermonuclear devices. Technological advancements have improved core designs, enhancing weapon efficiency and yield. A comparison with international designs, notably the Soviet Union, highlights differences. Overall, these documents intricately analyze nuclear weapon design, emphasizing core components’ significance, evolution through testing and innovation, and insights into global nuclear capabilities, shaping a comprehensive understanding of these powerful armaments.

Dr Francesco Dergano
6 min readAug 30, 2024

DoD Directive 3150.02, which outlines the Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Surety Program. The directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to ensure the safety, security, and control of U.S. nuclear weapons and weapon systems in DoD custody. Here’s a summary of key points relevant to the legacy of manufacturing in the supply chain of nuclear weapons:

1. Purpose and Policy:
— The directive reissues and updates previous policies to maintain the oversight of nuclear weapons surety, emphasizing safety, security, and control.
— The President is the sole authority for the employment of nuclear weapons.
— Nuclear weapons require special consideration due to their destructive power and political significance, necessitating stringent safety and security measures.

2. Safety and Security Standards:
— The directive mandates the development of standards and procedures to ensure the safe, secure, and reliable management of nuclear weapons across their entire lifecycle, from manufacturing to decommissioning.
— It specifies that nuclear weapons systems should be designed or improved using advanced safety and security technologies whenever feasible, incorporating maximum surety consistent with operational requirements.

3. Responsibilities:
— The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) oversees the nuclear weapons surety program, including approving safety rules and ensuring compliance across all DoD components.
— The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) is responsible for developing nuclear weapons safety and security policies and monitoring their implementation.
— The directive also involves the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in providing technical advice, assistance, and training related to nuclear weapons surety.

4. Manufacturing and Supply Chain Considerations:
— The directive implies that all entities involved in the lifecycle of nuclear weapons, including those responsible for manufacturing and supply chain management, must comply with strict safety and security standards.
— The policy also covers the certification of procedures, personnel, equipment, and facilities involved in nuclear weapons operations to ensure they meet the established standards.

5. Continuous Evaluation and Improvement:
— The directive requires that nuclear weapons systems be evaluated throughout their lifecycle to ensure ongoing compliance with safety and security standards.
— It encourages the use of risk analysis to inform the incorporation of safety and security technologies during the design and improvement phases.

DoD Directive 3150.02 sets forth a comprehensive framework for ensuring that all aspects of nuclear weapons management, including manufacturing and supply chain processes, are conducted with the highest levels of safety, security, and control. This directive mandates continuous evaluation, adherence to strict standards, and the incorporation of advanced technologies to mitigate risks associated with nuclear weapons.

Plutonium and Uranium Core Weights in Nuclear Weapons

The document provides a detailed examination of the known weights and configurations of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U-235, also known as Oralloy or Oy) used in the primary cores of various atomic (A-bomb) and hydrogen bombs (H-bomb). This information is highly technical and specific to different nuclear tests and bomb models from the early development of nuclear weapons through various tests conducted by the United States and other nations.

Key Points:

1. Core Composition and Design:
— The document details various combinations of delta-plutonium (δ-Pu) and Oralloy (Oy) used in the cores of nuclear weapons. These cores are the central components of nuclear bombs, where the fission reaction is initiated.
— Different designs, such as solid cores, hollow cores, and composite cores (a mix of Pu and Oy), are described. These designs have been tested across multiple operations and are optimized for various yields and efficiencies.

2. Historical Nuclear Tests:
— Specific nuclear tests, such as the 1945 “Fat Man” dropped on Nagasaki, the 1948 Operation Sandstone, and the 1952 Operation Ivy, are discussed in relation to the cores used in these tests. The document provides the exact weights, dimensions, and configurations of the cores used in these bombs.
— For example, the “Fat Man” bomb had a 6.19 kg δ-Pu core, while the “Little Boy” bomb used 64 kg of Oy in a gun assembly configuration.

3. Efficiency and Yield:
— The document highlights the efficiency of different core materials in producing the desired nuclear yield. For instance, Oy is described as being less efficient than Pu, with some tests showing Oy at 40% of the efficiency of Pu.
— The yield of these nuclear weapons varies significantly depending on the core design, ranging from small yields in the kiloton range to massive yields in the megaton range, especially in thermonuclear weapons.

4. Technological Developments:
— Over time, the design of nuclear weapon cores evolved, with improvements in the efficiency of the fission reaction and the overall yield of the weapons. The document discusses these developments, such as the transition from solid cores to hollow or levitated cores, which enhanced the performance of the bombs.

5. International Comparisons:
— The document also references nuclear weapon designs and tests conducted by other nations, such as the Soviet Union’s “Joe-3” test, providing a comparative analysis of core designs and yields.

The document is a comprehensive technical reference on the plutonium and uranium core weights and configurations used in the primary stages of various nuclear weapons. It provides detailed insights into the materials, dimensions, and efficiencies of different core designs, reflecting the technological advancements and testing strategies employed by the United States and other nuclear powers in the development of nuclear arsenals.

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Dr Francesco Dergano
Dr Francesco Dergano

Written by Dr Francesco Dergano

CEO of Skydatasol —Managing Principal of Kamiweb Project —Lead Research Manager and CISO of The National Security Framework—Full-Time Student in London

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